Verhagen v RSPCA [2025] QDC 55: Navigating the Complexities of Animal Welfare, Evidentiary Rules, and Procedural Fairness in Queensland Appeals

Introduction
Based on the authentic Australian judicial case Verhagen v RSPCA [2025] QDC 55, this article disassembles the Court’s judgment process regarding evidence and law. It transforms complex judicial reasoning into clear, understandable key point analyses, helping readers identify the core of the dispute, understand the judgment logic, make more rational litigation choices, and providing case resources for practical research to readers of all backgrounds.

Chapter 1: Case Overview and Core Disputes

###### Basic Information:
Court of Hearing: District Court of Queensland
Presiding Judge: Lynch KC DCJ
Cause of Action: Appeal against convictions and sentence for animal welfare offences.
Judgment Date: 17 April 2025
Core Keywords:
Keyword 1: Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld)
Keyword 2: Justices Act 1886 (Qld) – Section 222 Appeal
Keyword 3: Duty of Care to Animals
Keyword 4: Admissibility of Evidence
Keyword 5: Procedural Fairness and Particulars
Keyword 6: Animal Cruelty

###### Background:
The Appellant, Elizabeth Alice Verhagen, faced 13 convictions in the Magistrates Court at Ipswich for offences under the Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (ACPA). These charges stemmed from allegations of mistreatment of dogs on her property, primarily related to failing to provide adequate water, maintain clean accommodation, treat diseases, and causing unjustified pain, as well as breaching a compulsory code of conduct for breeding dogs. The Appellant, who was self-represented, appealed both the convictions and the sentence imposed, which included an 18-month probation period, costs, and a five-year prohibition from breeding dogs.

###### Core Disputes and Claims:
The central legal dispute revolved around whether the learned acting Magistrate erred in fact or law in finding the Appellant guilty of the various animal welfare offences. The Appellant challenged the admissibility of evidence, the lawfulness of search and seizure operations, the Magistrate’s interpretation and application of evidentiary rules (specifically regarding her treatment records), and whether the prosecution proved the elements of each charge beyond reasonable doubt, particularly considering inconsistencies in expert testimony and the specificity of particulars. The Appellant sought to have her convictions set aside and verdicts of not guilty entered for all charges.

Chapter 2: Origin of the Case

The genesis of this protracted litigation began with the Appellant’s long-standing involvement with the RSPCA. In 2007, the Appellant relocated from Victoria to Queensland, where she established a dog breeding operation, which she described as a hobby rather than a commercial business. Her history with the RSPCA in Queensland was fraught, including a prior incident in 2011 where animals were seized, leading to charges that were ultimately dismissed. The Appellant firmly believed that this history prejudiced her and motivated the present seizure of animals, arguing that the charges were brought to retrospectively justify the seizures.

The decisive moments leading to the current litigation occurred on 3 June 2020, when RSPCA inspectors, accompanied by police, executed a warrant at the Appellant’s property. The inspection, which lasted an entire day, involved extensive documentation, including photographs and video recordings of the animals and their enclosures. While initial indications from Inspector Barraud suggested no animals would be seized, this decision was reportedly altered after a phone call with a superior, leading to the seizure of several dogs. A subsequent visit on 15 July 2020, conducted earlier than a pre-arranged time, resulted in further seizures based on alleged non-compliance with an animal welfare direction issued earlier. The Appellant contended that on both occasions, the timing of the inspection (early morning) unfairly presented her animals’ living conditions in a negative light, as she had not yet completed her daily routine of feeding, watering, and cleaning due to her personal health conditions. This chain of events directly led to the multitude of charges and the Appellant’s subsequent appeals, fueled by her conviction that the inspections and charges were retaliatory and improper.

Chapter 3: Key Evidence and Core Disputes

###### Applicant’s Main Evidence and Arguments:
* Flea Treatment Records (Exhibit 12 & 25): The Appellant presented calendar entries (Exhibit 12) and a detailed spreadsheet (Exhibit 25) to demonstrate a consistent and multi-faceted flea treatment regime for all her dogs, including bathing, powder, topical treatments, and flea collars. She argued that the prevalence of fleas was due to the large, dirt-filled property in drought conditions, making complete eradication impossible, and that many observed fleas were dead.
* Bedding: The Appellant argued that large dogs (Great Danes, Golden Retrievers) destroyed and ingested bedding, posing a health risk. Based on veterinary advice, she ceased providing soft bedding for these dogs.
* Dental Disease: The Appellant asserted that her dogs showed no signs of discomfort, irritability, or changes in eating habits, despite some discolouration or tartar, which she attributed to age or diet. She adopted preventative measures like dental chews and raw bones.
* Ear Infection (Jigsaw): The Appellant testified she was actively treating Jigsaw’s ear infection with Otiderm spray and Flagyl tablets for about 10 days, medications she showed to Inspector Barraud.
* Osteoarthritis (Cody): The Appellant acknowledged Cody’s arthritis but stated she managed it daily with turmeric, supported by literature on its anti-inflammatory benefits.
* Lump Removal (Cody – Charge 15): The Appellant admitted to cutting two lumps from Cody’s body using a scalpel after applying numbing cream. She and her daughter, Jessica Myers, testified that the lumps were superficial (open wounds from scratching), Cody showed no signs of pain, and the wounds were dressed and treated with antibiotics. She estimated this occurred “18 months ago.”
* Water Supply (Charges 26, 28): The Appellant claimed to have provided water the previous evening, asserting that empty bowls on the morning of 15 July 2020 were implausible given her routine and the weather. Her daughter, Tiana Daniels, supported this, stating she saw water in the bowls that morning.
* Cleaning of Enclosures: The Appellant admitted that some enclosures had not been cleaned daily due to her psychiatric appointment (pen 7 for two days) or being physically unwell (pen 6 for up to a week), but argued the faeces accumulation was not excessive given the large size of the pens and her late-day feeding schedule.
* Objection to Prosecution’s Conduct: The Appellant argued the prosecution was improperly brought by the RSPCA, evidence was unlawfully obtained through invalid warrants or non-compliance with DAF guidelines, and the charges were retaliatory due to her history with the RSPCA. She also contended the Magistrate erred in excluding her Departmental review decision regarding the animal seizures and RSPCA settlement offers.

###### Respondent’s Main Evidence and Arguments:
* Flea Infestation (Pablo, Poppy, Nala, Jigsaw, Honey, Cody): Inspectors Wahlberg-Schmitt, Heath-Crilley, and Barraud, along with veterinarians Dr Chester, Dr Sharman, and Dr Stewart, consistently reported severe live flea burdens on multiple dogs, which they estimated had accumulated over weeks or months. They largely refuted the Appellant’s claim that fleas were dead. Dr Sharman noted Jigsaw’s anaemia was due to fleas.
* Unclean Enclosures (Pens 1, 6, 7): Inspectors consistently described significant build-ups of faeces (some weeks old) in the enclosures. Exhibit 5 (Pen 6 photographs) was cited as evidence of heavy faecal litter and prickles.
* Lack of Bedding (Nala, Jigsaw, Honey, Cody): Inspectors observed no bedding in pens 6 and 7. Dr Chester stated that dogs should have a choice of soft bedding or alternatives like hammock beds.
* Dental Disease (Summer, Pablo, Jigsaw, Cody):
* Summer: Dr Sharman diagnosed a fractured, necrotic canine tooth, amounting to dental disease, evident for “at least a couple of weeks” and generally obvious to a layperson.
* Pablo: Dr Chester described severe (Grade 4) dental disease, including chronic gingivitis, bone resorption, and an oronasal fistula, which had developed over “at least six months” and required 18 teeth extractions.
* Jigsaw: Dr Sharman noted proliferative gingivitis with overgrown, inflamed gums, a “long-standing” condition developed over “months or more likely years,” expected to cause mouth pain.
* Cody: Dr Chester diagnosed Grade 3 dental disease with plaque, receding gums, and ulcerations, present for “at least a couple of months.”
* Ear Infection (Jigsaw): Dr Sharman diagnosed a chronic ear infection (discharge, inflammation, thickening of ear canal skin) present for “months,” treatable with topical drops, and said she saw no evidence of treatment.
* Osteoarthritis (Cody): Inspector Finigan observed muscle wastage and mobility issues. Dr Chester diagnosed osteoarthritis due to hip dysplasia, requiring pain relief and anti-inflammatory tablets. Inspector Finigan denied turmeric was an appropriate treatment.
* Lump Removal (Cody – Charge 15): Dr Chester stated that numbing creams like lignocaine do not penetrate skin sufficiently for surgery, making the procedure “significantly painful” if lumps were subcutaneous. She maintained that removal of lumps from under the skin with numbing cream was never a reasonable method.
* Hookworm Infection (Honey, Cody): Dr Sharman and Dr Chester confirmed positive hookworm tests for both dogs. Dr Sharman stated she had never seen hookworm in a properly treated dog and that infection can occur from soil contaminated with faeces.
* Water Availability (Charges 26, 28): Inspectors Barraud and Nikovic testified that water bowls in relevant enclosures were “completely dry” on 15 July 2020 morning, refuting the Appellant’s claims of prior watering.
* Propriety of Prosecution: Counsel for RSPCA argued the prosecution was lawfully brought by RSPCA inspectors under ACPA, and that internal guidelines or Departmental decisions on seizures were irrelevant to the proof of charges. They also opposed the admission of the Appellant’s spreadsheet as not being a “business record” under s 93 of the Evidence Act 1977.

###### Core Dispute Points:
1. Credibility of Witness Testimony: Direct conflict between RSPCA inspectors/veterinarians and the Appellant/her daughters regarding the condition of animals (live vs. dead fleas, severity of dental disease, presence of water, age of faeces build-up) and the effectiveness of treatments.
2. Sufficiency/Appropriateness of Treatment: Whether the Appellant’s self-administered treatments (flea control, turmeric for arthritis, lump removal with numbing cream, worming) met the “reasonable steps” standard under ACPA, particularly in light of expert veterinary opinion.
3. Interpretation of “Unclean” and “Housing”: The Magistrate’s finding that an enclosure was unclean due to “caked on dirt” not particularised by the prosecution, and the interpretation of “housing” regarding temporary confinement for mating.
4. Admissibility of Appellant’s Records (Exhibit 25): Whether the Appellant’s spreadsheet of animal treatments constituted a “business record” under s 93 Evidence Act 1977 for admissibility purposes, given her claim of dog breeding as a hobby.
5. Time Limitation for Charges: Whether Charge 15 (cruelty for lump removal) was brought within the statutory time limits, given conflicting recollections of when the event occurred.
6. Procedural Fairness/Prosecutorial Impropriety: The Appellant’s arguments regarding the RSPCA’s authority to prosecute, the lawfulness of searches and seizures, and the exclusion of evidence related to DAF’s review decision or settlement offers.

Chapter 4: Statements in Affidavits

In this case, the formal “Affidavit” was not the primary mechanism for presenting direct witness testimony as is common in civil proceedings. Instead, the parties’ positions were largely established through oral evidence at trial, often guided by prior witness statements and reports, and confronted during cross-examination. The “strategic intent” behind the Magistrate’s procedural directions, particularly in managing the self-represented Appellant, was to ensure that despite her lack of legal training, the trial adhered to evidentiary rules.

For instance, the Appellant attempted to cross-examine Inspector Heath-Crilley with her own “record of treatment of animals” (which largely mirrored Exhibit 12, her calendar entries) and later sought to admit her detailed spreadsheet (Exhibit 25). The Magistrate’s ruling that these documents were “more properly one she could introduce herself in evidence” and later excluding the spreadsheet as not a “business record” under s 93 Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) reflected a strict adherence to formal evidentiary pathways. This constrained the Appellant’s ability to use her records to directly contradict witness testimony or establish her defence without proper foundational evidence. Similarly, the Magistrate’s upholding of objections to cross-examination based on documents not prepared or seen by the witness, or lacking direct relevance to the charges, was aimed at streamlining the evidence to facts in issue and preventing the introduction of unsubstantiated claims or irrelevant material. These directions, while procedurally sound, highlight the challenge faced by self-represented litigants in navigating complex evidentiary rules to effectively present their case.

Chapter 5: Court Orders

Prior to the final hearing, the following procedural arrangements and orders were made:
* The prosecution withdrew 21 of the initial 35 charges at the commencement of the trial.
* Other charges were amended, including the removal of certain dogs from Charge 30 (though this appears to have been imperfectly executed when the charge was read).
* The Magistrate declared the Appellant a “special witness” due to medical conditions, requiring regular breaks and accommodation for shortened hearing days.
* The Magistrate ruled against the Appellant’s preliminary submissions concerning the inadmissibility of evidence or a stay of proceedings due to alleged impropriety by the RSPCA investigator.
* The Magistrate deferred ruling on the time limitation issue for Charge 15 until the end of evidence.
* The Appellant’s document (spreadsheet, Exhibit 25) was provisionally admitted, subject to a final ruling on its admissibility as a business record under s 93 of the Evidence Act 1977.
* Objections to the admission of various “additional evidence” sought by the Appellant (e.g., DAF review decision, RSPCA email correspondence, internet articles) were largely upheld by the Magistrate due to lack of relevance or proper evidentiary foundation.

Chapter 6: Hearing Scene: Ultimate Showdown of Evidence and Logic

The trial before the Magistrates Court unfolded over seven sitting days, a testament to the complexity and contested nature of the charges, exacerbated by the Appellant’s self-representation and health considerations. The courtroom became the arena where the RSPCA’s observations and expert veterinary opinions clashed directly with the Appellant’s experience-based claims and efforts to manage her animals’ welfare.

###### Process Reconstruction:
A key aspect of the hearing involved the cross-examination of RSPCA inspectors and veterinarians by the Appellant. The Appellant consistently challenged their observations and opinions, often by referring to her own documents or alternative explanations. For instance, the Appellant put it to Inspector Wahlberg-Schmitt that fleas on the animals were dead, not live, a contention he denied. She also cross-examined Dr Chester regarding the efficacy of numbing cream for lump removal, extracting a crucial concession from the expert. This concession highlighted the variability of pain perception depending on the lump’s nature and the unknown type of cream used, directly challenging the blanket assertion that the procedure would be “significantly painful.” The Appellant’s attempts to introduce documents or challenge evidence based on alleged inconsistencies between witness statements and reports often met with objections, with the Magistrate repeatedly guiding her on proper evidentiary procedure. Her insistence on the relevance of her prior dealings with the RSPCA and the Department’s subsequent overturning of animal seizures on 15 July 2020 also demonstrated her belief in prosecutorial impropriety, though these lines of argument were largely rejected by the Magistrate.

###### Core Evidence Confrontation:
The most decisive evidence presented in court included the photographic and video evidence from the RSPCA inspections (Exhibits 2, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 23), detailed veterinary reports from Drs Chester and Sharman, and the Appellant’s own admissions during recorded conversations with inspectors (Exhibit 16). The RSPCA’s case heavily relied on the visual evidence of unsanitary enclosures and the expert veterinary findings of severe, chronic conditions such as dental disease, ear infections, severe flea burdens, and hookworm. The Appellant’s defence hinged on her detailed treatment records (Exhibit 12 and the eventually admitted Exhibit 25), her extensive experience with animals, and the testimony of her daughters. The confrontation over the admissibility of the Appellant’s spreadsheet (Exhibit 25) became a crucial point, initially excluded by the Magistrate on the basis that breeding was not a “business,” but later deemed admissible on appeal. This piece of evidence, documenting consistent treatments, served as a direct counter-narrative to the prosecution’s claims of neglect.

###### Judicial Reasoning:
In determining the outcomes, the primary factual findings, particularly regarding the state of the animals and their enclosures, largely rested on the credibility of the RSPCA inspectors and veterinarians. The Magistrate, having the advantage of observing witnesses, generally preferred their evidence over that of the Appellant and her daughters. However, the appellate judge’s reasoning demonstrates a more nuanced approach, scrutinizing the Magistrate’s application of evidentiary rules and the logical inferences drawn from the facts.

On the issue of the admissibility of the Appellant’s treatment spreadsheet, the appellate judge stated:

“Many businesses, although operated with the intention of making a profit, are not profitable. Many charities might readily be regarded as operating a business as part of carrying out their core objective, although the organisation overall is not aimed at making a profit… The Appellant’s breeding and selling of dogs was clearly commercial. It involved her mating dogs, advertising pups for sale, preparing the pups to be traded, receiving payment upon delivery to a customer. That she did not make a profit or may have broken even does not deprive the activity of its commercial quality. The Appellant’s description of that activity as a hobby not a business seems to me irrelevant. In my view the ordinary meaning of business includes ongoing commercial operations, regardless of profitability. I conclude the learned acting Magistrate erred in ruling the Appellant’s spreadsheet was not made in the course of her business.”

This quotation highlights the appellate court’s rejection of the Magistrate’s narrow interpretation of “business” under the Evidence Act, opening the door for the Appellant’s detailed treatment records to be considered as evidence, thereby fundamentally altering the evidentiary landscape of the appeal.

Similarly, regarding the Magistrate’s finding on Charge 1 (unclean enclosure for Pablo and Poppy) where the Magistrate convicted on a basis not particularised by the prosecution, the appellate judge noted:

“The factual allegation made by the prosecution, in attempting to prove those particulars was that the enclosure was unclean because of a build-up of faeces… The learned acting Magistrate was not satisfied the claimed build-up of faeces was made out based upon his examination of the photographs of the enclosure. Yet his Honour concluded the photographs showed the enclosure was unclean because of dirt he observed… That allegation was not how the prosecution sought to prove this part of the charge and no application to amend the particulars… was made. Importantly, the appellant was not given notice of any change of the basis of liability and no opportunity to defend the allegation formulated by the acting Magistrate.”

This crucial finding by the appellate court underscores the importance of particulars in criminal proceedings, emphasizing that a defendant must be afforded the opportunity to defend against the specific allegations advanced by the prosecution. The Magistrate’s deviation from the particularised case without amendment or notice constituted a clear error of law.

Chapter 7: Final Judgment of the Court

The District Court, in its appellate jurisdiction, issued the following final orders:
1. In respect of charge 3 of the complaint sworn on 1 July 2020 (Golden Retriever Summer, dental disease), and charges 8 (Great Dane Jigsaw, ear infection), 14 (Golden Retriever Cody, osteoarthritis), and 15 (Golden Retriever Cody, cruelty by lump removal) of the complaint sworn on 19 August 2020, the verdicts of guilty are set aside, and instead, verdicts of not guilty are entered. The Appellant is discharged in respect of those charges.
2. In respect of the appeals against conviction of charges 1 (Chihuahuas Pablo and Poppy, unclean enclosure/fleas), 10 (Golden Retrievers Honey and Cody, unclean enclosure/bedding/fleas/hookworm), and 30 (breach of compulsory code requirement) of the complaint sworn on 19 August 2020, the verdicts of guilty are confirmed, subject to the factual findings as set out in these reasons (i.e., some elements of the particulars within these charges were not proven, but the overall conviction stands on proven elements).
3. In respect of charges 3 (Chihuahua Pablo, dental disease), 7 (Great Danes Nala and Jigsaw, unclean enclosure/bedding/fleas), 9 (Great Dane Jigsaw, dental disease), 13 (Golden Retriever Cody, dental disease), 26 (Chihuahuas Twinkie, Chica, Golden Retriever Shayla, no water), and 28 (Chihuahuas Cadbury, Pixie, Pippa, Papi, no water) of the complaint sworn on 19 August 2020, the verdicts of guilty are confirmed.

The Court indicated it would hear the parties as to sentence and any ancillary orders, acknowledging that the Appellant had effectively served the original probation period and that the number and basis of convictions had changed.

Chapter 8: In-depth Analysis of the Judgment: How Law and Evidence Lay the Foundation for Victory

###### Special Analysis:
This case is unusual for several reasons, highlighting critical aspects of procedural fairness, evidentiary rules, and the nuanced application of animal welfare legislation. Firstly, the Appellant was a self-represented litigant, which often presents significant challenges in complex trials. The appellate court acknowledged the Magistrate’s efforts to accommodate her but ultimately found errors in the application of evidentiary rules that prejudiced her defence. Secondly, the case delves into the specifics of animal welfare offences, where “duty of care” is assessed against a “reasonable person” standard, often balancing expert veterinary opinion against an owner’s practical experiences and attempts at care. The distinction drawn between superficial versus subcutaneous lump removal, and the effectiveness of common treatments (like turmeric), showcases the fine lines in determining criminal cruelty or neglect. Thirdly, the appeal successfully challenged several convictions based on the Magistrate’s misinterpretation of evidence, misapplication of legal principles (e.g., “business record” for s 93 Evidence Act), and crucially, convicting on grounds not particularised by the prosecution, demonstrating the vital role of particulars in criminal proceedings. The reversal of multiple convictions (including an animal cruelty charge under s 18 ACPA and charges based on the Magistrate’s unparticularised findings) underscores the rigorous scrutiny appellate courts apply to ensure fair trials, even for summary offences.

###### Judgment Points:
1. Admissibility of “Business Records” (Exhibit 25): The appellate court clarified the interpretation of “business” under s 93(1)(a) of the Evidence Act 1977, holding that ongoing commercial operations, regardless of profitability, constitute a business. This broad interpretation allowed the Appellant’s spreadsheet detailing animal treatments to be admitted, reversing the Magistrate’s error and providing crucial evidence for the defence.
2. Strict Adherence to Particulars: The Court firmly established that a conviction cannot be sustained on a basis not particularised by the prosecution, especially when no amendment was sought or notice given to the defendant. This was a critical error by the Magistrate in Charge 1 (complaint sworn 19/8/2020), where an enclosure was found “unclean” due to dirt buildup, a fact not alleged in the particulars that focused on faeces buildup.
3. Nuance in Expert Testimony Evaluation (Charge 15 – Cruelty): The appellate court highlighted the Magistrate’s error in selectively applying Dr Chester’s expert evidence regarding numbing cream for lump removal. Dr Chester’s qualifications and contradictions in her own statements (recorded in a file note and cross-examination) indicated uncertainty about whether pain was definitely caused, especially if the lumps were superficial as the Appellant claimed. The Magistrate’s blanket acceptance of “significantly painful” without addressing these nuances was found to be an error.
4. Time Limitation for Charges (Charge 15 – Cruelty): The appellate court identified a fatal flaw in the prosecution’s case for Charge 15: the failure to prove the offence occurred within the statutory time limit. The Appellant’s “18 months ago” estimate was considered insufficient beyond reasonable doubt, especially when contrasted with her daughter’s “years ago, perhaps 2018” estimate, exposing a gap in proving the charge was commenced within two years of the offence’s commission.
5. Evidence of Treatment Efficacy vs. Presence of Condition: For hookworm (Charge 10), the Court rejected the Magistrate’s conclusion that because Dr Sharman “never saw hookworm in a dog properly treated,” the Appellant’s claim of worming was false. The Court noted Dr Sharman also conceded that treatment kills adult worms but not eggs, meaning a dog could still test positive for eggs after treatment. The Appellant’s calendar entries (Exhibit 12) showing prior worming supported her defence, demonstrating reasonable steps taken despite persistent challenges.
6. “Reasonable Steps” for Bedding and Flea Control: The Court confirmed that a blanket refusal to provide bedding (Charge 7, 10), even due to dogs destroying it, was not a “reasonable step” when alternatives (e.g., hammock beds) existed. Similarly, while the Appellant undertook numerous flea treatments, their obvious ineffectiveness meant that “reasonable steps” (Charge 1, 7, 10) required more, including potentially removing dogs from infested areas, rather than merely continuing ineffective treatments.
7. Inappropriateness of Lay Opinion over Expert (Charge 14 – Osteoarthritis): The appellate court found the Magistrate erred by relying on Inspector Finigan’s lay opinion that turmeric was not an appropriate treatment for arthritis, while simultaneously disregarding Dr Chester’s expert concession that turmeric was indeed considered beneficial as an anti-inflammatory. This undermined the Magistrate’s finding that the Appellant failed her duty of care.

###### Legal Basis:
The Court primarily referred to the following statutory provisions:
* Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 222: Authorising the appeal.
* Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 223: Defining the appeal as a rehearing on original evidence, with discretion to admit fresh evidence under “special grounds.”
* Justices Act 1886 (Qld) s 225: Empowering the appellate court to confirm, set aside, vary, or make any other just order.
* Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) s 12: Defining “person in charge” of an animal (owner, custodian).
* Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) s 15: Requiring compliance with compulsory codes of practice, specifically regarding housing and exercise areas.
* Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) s 17: Prohibiting breach of duty of care (failure to take reasonable steps to provide for needs like food, water, accommodation, treatment of disease/injury).
* Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) s 18: Prohibiting animal cruelty (causing unjustifiable, unnecessary, or unreasonable pain).
* Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) s 178: Setting time limitations for commencing proceedings for summary offences.
* Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 93: Admissibility of documentary evidence as to facts in issue in criminal proceedings, particularly “business records.”
* Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 101: Use of prior inconsistent statements as evidence of the truth of their contents.
* Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 106: Admissibility of reproductions of documents “made or used in the course of a business.”
* Queensland Animal Welfare Standards and Guidelines for Breeding Dogs and their Progeny (Schedule 3A of the Animal Care and Protection Regulation 2012): For defining appropriate housing and welfare standards.

###### Evidence Chain:
The successful points in the appeal relied on the following key evidence:
* The Appellant’s detailed spreadsheet (Exhibit 25), when considered admissible, provided systematic records of animal treatments, directly challenging claims of neglect.
* Contradictions within Dr Chester’s own expert testimony, particularly her file note and cross-examination concessions regarding the uncertainty of pain caused by lump removal (Charge 15), weakened the prosecution’s case.
* Jessica Myers’ evidence regarding the lump removal, describing open wounds and Cody’s lack of distress, became credible when aligned with Dr Chester’s qualified opinions for superficial wounds.
* The Appellant’s uncontradicted evidence and supporting calendar entries (Exhibit 12) for worming (Charge 10), combined with expert concessions that hookworm eggs can persist post-treatment, supported her efforts.
* Dr Chester’s acknowledgement of turmeric as a beneficial anti-inflammatory directly contradicted Inspector Finigan’s lay opinion, negating the finding of insufficient treatment for osteoarthritis (Charge 14).
* For Charges 26 and 28 (lack of water), the consistent testimony of Inspectors Barraud and Nikovic, corroborated by photographic evidence (Exhibit 23) of dry bowls, formed a strong factual basis, outweighing the Appellant’s and Tiana Daniels’ implausible counter-claims.
* For Charges 1, 7, 10, 30 (unclean enclosures, fleas, lack of bedding), the photographic evidence of faeces buildup (Exhibits 5, 8) and expert testimony regarding severe live flea burdens (Drs Chester, Sharman) and the obvious ineffectiveness of treatments, coupled with the Appellant’s admitted lack of bedding, formed a solid evidence chain for conviction on these elements.

###### Judicial Original Quotation:
On the role of particulars in criminal trials, the Court emphasized:

“Second, Knight is authority for the proposition that where, as here, the Crown provides particulars of the indictment, which become part of the court record, the Crown is bound by those particulars unless, and until, they are amended; and furthermore, where leave to amend the particulars is sought by the Crown, a trial judge is obliged to consider the prejudice the proposed amendment would occasion to the accused person when determining whether leave should be granted… factors particularly relevant to the question of prejudice will include that the accused came to meet a Crown case differently particularised, and that on the state of the evidence at the time of the application the Crown case would likely fail, and the accused might thereby lose a chance of acquittal if the amendment was allowed.”

This quotation from R v BEO [2025] QCA 40 (citing R v Knight (2022) 11 QR 704) was determinative for Charge 1 (complaint sworn 19/8/2020). The Magistrate had found the enclosure unclean due to “caked on dirt,” a basis not particularised by the prosecution, which focused solely on “build-up of faeces.” This unparticularised finding was an error, as the Appellant was denied notice and the opportunity to defend against this specific allegation. The original allegation regarding faeces was not proven.

###### Analysis of the Losing Party’s Failure:
The prosecution’s failure in several charges stemmed from a combination of:
* Inadequate Particularisation: For Charge 1, the prosecution’s particulars focused on “faeces build-up” to prove the enclosure was unclean. When the Magistrate was not satisfied on this specific ground, he shifted to “caked on dirt,” which was not particularised. This procedural misstep meant the Appellant was convicted on a basis she was not given notice to defend.
* Insufficient Proof of Elements (Charge 15): For the cruelty charge, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the lump removal caused pain that was unjustifiable, unnecessary, or unreasonable. Dr Chester’s qualified evidence and the Appellant’s/Jessica Myers’ testimony that the lumps were open wounds and no pain was observed created reasonable doubt. Additionally, the prosecution failed to definitively prove the event occurred within the statutory time limit, relying on a casual estimate.
* Misjudgment of Evidentiary Rules (Exhibit 25): The prosecution successfully objected to the Appellant’s spreadsheet (Exhibit 25) as a business record, arguing her breeding was a hobby. This narrow interpretation was overturned on appeal, highlighting a missed opportunity to fully present her defence evidence at trial.
* Overreliance on General Expert Statements without Specificity (Charges 3, 8, 14): In several charges, while expert veterinarians described chronic conditions, the prosecution sometimes failed to establish when the Appellant became aware, or what specific reasonable steps a layperson in her position should have taken beyond what she already did. For example, for Summer’s broken canine (Charge 3), despite it being “dental disease,” the expert didn’t prescribe pain relief and it was unclear when the Appellant knew, or what additional reasonable steps she should have taken beyond observation. For Jigsaw’s ear infection (Charge 8), the Appellant was already providing appropriate treatment, and the prosecution failed to show her efforts were unreasonable or that veterinary intervention was exclusively necessary from the outset. For Cody’s osteoarthritis (Charge 14), the Magistrate accepted lay opinion over expert testimony regarding turmeric as a treatment, leading to a flawed conviction.

Implications
1. Know Your Rights and the Specifics: For any animal owners, especially those with multiple animals or involved in breeding, understanding the Animal Care and Protection Act and relevant codes of practice is paramount. Be meticulous in documenting all care and treatments, as these records can be crucial defence evidence.
2. The Power of Detailed Records: This case powerfully illustrates that even if you consider an activity a “hobby,” if it involves commercial aspects (like selling animals), comprehensive records of care can be classified as “business records” under the Evidence Act. Keep detailed, contemporaneous notes of all treatments, veterinary visits, and animal welfare efforts.
3. Procedural Fairness is Key: The legal system demands fairness. If you are charged with an offence, the prosecution is generally bound by the specific details they allege (the “particulars”). If the court tries to convict you on a different basis, you have the right to challenge that, as it denies you the opportunity to properly defend yourself.
4. Seek Professional Advice Early: While self-representation is a right, navigating complex evidentiary rules and legal procedures can be overwhelming. Early legal advice can help ensure your evidence is presented correctly and that procedural missteps do not prejudice your case, even if it feels like a “hobby” dispute.
5. Critically Evaluate Expert Testimony: Even expert evidence must be carefully scrutinised. As shown with Dr Chester’s qualified statements, an expert’s opinion can be nuanced and conditional. Understanding these nuances can be vital in creating reasonable doubt. Don’t be afraid to probe the limits and conditions of expert opinions.

Q&A Session
1. Q: Why was the Appellant’s spreadsheet of animal treatments initially deemed inadmissible, and why was this reversed on appeal?
A: At trial, the Magistrate ruled the spreadsheet inadmissible because the Appellant described her dog breeding as a “hobby,” not a “business,” failing to meet the “business record” requirement under s 93 of the Evidence Act 1977. On appeal, the District Court reversed this, stating that any ongoing commercial operation, regardless of profitability (like selling 20 pups a year), constitutes a “business” in the ordinary meaning of the term. The court found that the Magistrate’s interpretation was too narrow and that the document should have been admitted.
2. Q: How did the “particulars” of the charges play a critical role in the appeal?
A: Particulars are specific details of the alleged offence provided by the prosecution. For Charge 1, the prosecution particularised that the enclosure was “unclean due to a build-up of faeces.” The Magistrate, however, was not satisfied by the evidence for faeces but found it unclean due to “caked on dirt.” The appellate court held this was an error because the Appellant was not given notice or opportunity to defend against the unparticularised allegation of “caked on dirt,” thereby denying her procedural fairness.
3. Q: Why were the convictions for “cruelty by lump removal” and “failing to treat osteoarthritis” overturned, despite expert veterinary testimony?
A: For the cruelty charge (Charge 15), the appellate court found insufficient proof that the lump removal caused pain that was unjustifiable, unnecessary, or unreasonable. The expert testimony on numbing cream’s effectiveness was found to be qualified and contradictory, especially if the lumps were superficial as the Appellant claimed. There was also a failure to prove the charge was within the statutory time limit. For the osteoarthritis charge (Charge 14), the Magistrate erred by preferring a lay inspector’s opinion over the expert veterinarian’s concession that turmeric was a beneficial anti-inflammatory, thus wrongly concluding the Appellant’s treatment was inappropriate.

Appendix: Reference for Comparable Case Judgments and Practical Guidelines
1. Practical Positioning of This Case
Case Subtype: Animal Welfare Offences – Duty of Care & Cruelty Appeals
Judgment Nature Definition: Final Judgment (on appeal of convictions)
2. Self-examination of Core Statutory Elements
This case falls under ⑧ Criminal Law and Traffic Law.
###### Core Test (Elements of the Offence):
* Has the prosecution proven the “Actus Reus” (guilty act) and “Mens Rea” (guilty mind) coincided?
* For duty of care offences (s 17 ACPA), the “actus reus” is the failure to take “reasonable steps” to provide for an animal’s needs (food, water, accommodation, treatment). The “mens rea” typically involves negligence or recklessness, meaning the person knew or should have known of the animal’s needs and failed to act. It’s often assessed objectively (what a reasonable person would do), but the subjective circumstances of the accused are considered (s 17(4)(b)).
* For cruelty offences (s 18 ACPA), the “actus reus” is the act causing pain. The “mens rea” is typically that the act was done intentionally or recklessly, and the pain caused was “unjustifiable, unnecessary or unreasonable.”
* For compulsory code requirement breaches (s 15 ACPA), the “actus reus” is the non-compliance with the code, and “mens rea” generally implies knowledge or constructive knowledge of the requirement and the breach.
* Core Test (Standard of Proof):
* Does the evidence exclude “reasonable doubt”? In criminal proceedings, the prosecution bears the burden of proving every element of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt. If there is a plausible alternative explanation consistent with innocence, or if the evidence is insufficient to convince a reasonable mind of guilt, then reasonable doubt exists, and the defendant must be acquitted. This standard is rigorously applied on appeal, where the court must independently assess if reasonable doubt exists based on the entire evidence.
* Core Test (Sentencing): (Not the primary focus of this appeal as the sentence was to be re-heard, but relevant to the overall process).
* Are there aggravating or mitigating factors as per Section 9 of the Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) (e.g., early plea, remorse, prior record)? (Note: Section 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act is for NSW, not Qld).
* The Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) itself includes specific penalties (e.g., maximum penalty for s 17(2) is 300 penalty units or 1 year imprisonment, for s 18(1) is 2000 penalty units or 3 years imprisonment). The purpose of sentencing for animal welfare offences often includes deterrence, denunciation, and protecting animals.
3. Equitable Remedies and Alternative Claims
* Abuse of Process (Criminal / Traffic matters):
* Was the police/RSPCA procedure for gathering evidence lawful? The Appellant argued that search and seizure were unlawful or the prosecution was improperly motivated. While the warrant was found valid, questions about the conduct of the investigation (e.g., initial statements about no seizure, early morning inspections without prior agreement, the Department overturning seizures) could, if proven to be a grave impropriety, lead to an argument for exclusion of evidence under common law principles or a stay of proceedings if the conduct was so offensive as to bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
* Can an application be made to exclude illegally or improperly obtained evidence under Section 138 of the Evidence Act 1995? (Note: Queensland’s Evidence Act 1977 does not have an equivalent to s 138 of the Cth/NSW Evidence Act. Instead, common law discretion to exclude evidence obtained by illegal or unfair means applies. The test is whether the desirability of admitting the evidence is outweighed by the undesirability of admitting evidence that has been unlawfully or unfairly obtained, considering factors like the probative value, importance of the evidence, gravity of the impropriety, and whether the impropriety was reckless or deliberate. In this case, the Magistrate rejected the appellant’s submissions on exclusion, and the appellate court did not find an error in this regard based on the specific “additional evidence” presented).

1. Access Thresholds and Exceptional Circumstances
   ###### Regular Thresholds:
   • Time Limitation for Summary Offences (s 178 ACPA): Proceedings must start within the later of:
     • One year after the commission of the offence, OR
     • Six months after the offence comes to the complainant’s knowledge, BUT within two years after the commission of the offence. This “hard threshold” was central to Charge 15, where uncertainty about the actual date of the lump removal (18 months ago vs. “years ago, perhaps 2018”) meant the prosecution could not establish compliance beyond reasonable doubt.
       ###### Exceptional Channels (Crucial):
   • Judicial Discretion to Exclude Evidence: Even if evidence is legally admissible, a court retains a common law discretion to exclude it if its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect, or if it was obtained unlawfully or unfairly. This is a crucial “exceptional channel” for defendants, especially self-represented ones, to challenge evidence that might otherwise seem damaging.
   • Appellate Rehearing and Fresh Evidence (s 223 Justices Act): While generally an appeal is on the record, “special grounds” may allow for fresh, additional, or substituted evidence. This is an exceptional channel to correct injustices from trial, for instance, if evidence was improperly excluded or only discovered post-trial. The “reasonable diligence” and “might reasonably have led to a different result” tests are high bars.
     Suggestion: Do not abandon a potential claim simply because you do not meet the standard time or conditions. Carefully compare your circumstances against the exceptions above, as they are often the key to successfully filing a case or appealing a decision, especially where procedural fairness or evidentiary rules have been misapplied.
2. Guidelines for Judicial and Legal Citation
   ###### Citation Angle:
   It is recommended to cite this case in legal submissions or debates involving:
   • Appeals from Magistrates Courts (s 222 Justices Act).
   • The interpretation of “business” under s 93 of the Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) for documentary evidence, particularly concerning non-profit activities or those where profitability is not guaranteed.
   • The crucial role of “particulars” in criminal charges and the prohibition against convicting on unparticularised grounds.
   • Cases involving the evaluation of conflicting expert and lay evidence, particularly regarding the “reasonable steps” component of animal duty of care offences, and the nuances of assessing pain or treatment efficacy.
   • Situations involving self-represented litigants where procedural errors or misapplication of evidentiary rules by the trial court might have prejudiced the defendant.
     ###### Citation Method:
   • As Positive Support: When your matter involves:
     • Arguing for the admissibility of comprehensive records from a commercial venture (even if not explicitly profitable) under s 93 Evidence Act.
     • Challenging a conviction where the trial judge made findings of guilt on facts not particularised by the prosecution without amendment.
     • Contending that a charge of cruelty or breach of duty of care has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt, especially when expert evidence is qualified or inconsistent, or a statutory time limit is uncertain.
     • Demonstrating that an appellant’s efforts to provide care, even if not fully successful, constituted “reasonable steps” given their circumstances and available advice.
   • As a Distinguishing Reference: If the opposing party cites this case, you should emphasize the following uniqueness of the current matter to argue that this precedent is not applicable:
     • The specific facts of animal care and conditions may differ significantly, warranting a different application of “reasonable steps.”
     • The nature or severity of animal disease/injury might be demonstrably different, making certain treatments or lack thereof clearly unreasonable in the current context.
     • The procedural errors (e.g., misapplication of s 93, deviation from particulars) identified in Verhagen might not be present in the current trial, thus limiting its application to the merits of the factual findings.
       Anonymisation Rule: Do not use the real names of the parties; strictly use professional procedural titles such as Appellant / Respondent.

Conclusion
This judgment serves as a vital reminder of the rigorous standards of proof and procedural fairness required in Australian courts, particularly when balancing expert opinion with practical realities and the rights of self-represented litigants. It underscores that convictions must rest on clearly proven elements, within statutory limits, and on grounds explicitly communicated to the defence. Everyone needs to understand the law and see the world through the lens of law. The in-depth analysis of this authentic judgment is intended to help everyone gradually establish a new legal mindset: True self-protection stems from the early understanding and mastery of legal rules.

Disclaimer
This article is based on the study and analysis of the public judgment of the District Court of Queensland (Verhagen v RSPCA [2025] QDC 55), aimed at promoting legal research and public understanding. The citation of relevant judgment content is limited to the scope of fair dealing for the purposes of legal research, comment, and information sharing.
The analysis, structural arrangement, and expression of views contained in this article are the original content of the author, and the copyright belongs to the author and this platform. This article does not constitute legal advice, nor should it be regarded as legal advice for any specific situation.

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