Was a Family Trust Terminated by a $200,000 Payment to the Trustee’s Son? An Analysis of a Decades-Long Dispute Over Commingled Funds

Based on the authentic Australian judicial case Tjiong v Chang [2025] NSWCA 25, this article disassembles the Court’s judgment process regarding evidence and law. It transforms complex judicial reasoning into clear, understandable key point analyses, helping readers identify the core of the dispute, understand the judgment logic, make more rational litigation choices, and providing case resources for practical research to readers of all backgrounds.

Chapter 1: Case Overview and Core Disputes

Basic Information

• Court of Hearing: Supreme Court of New South Wales, Court of Appeal
• Presiding Judge: Basten AJA, Griffiths AJA, and Price AJA
• Cause of Action: Trusts, Equity, Trustee Indemnity
• Judgment Date: 28 February 2025
• Core Keywords:
  • Keyword 1: Authentic Judgment Case
  • Keyword 2: Burwood Trust
  • Keyword 3: Termination of Trust
  • Keyword 4: Commingled Funds
  • Keyword 5: Trustee Indemnity
  • Keyword 6: Onus of Proof

Background

This case revolves around a family trust, known as the “Burwood Trust,” established in 1976 through a private letter from a father, Hok Njan Tjiong, to his son, George Tjiong. George was appointed trustee of a residential unit, with the proceeds intended to care for his mother. The terms were later amended to benefit other family members in need. After the unit was sold in 1996, George, the trustee, deposited the proceeds into his personal bank account, mixing them with his own money. Following George’s death in 2004, a series of protracted legal battles erupted among family members. The current proceedings were initiated by a grandson of the original settlor, who claimed the trust still existed and sought the appointment of new trustees. The administrator of George’s estate, his daughter, defended the claim, arguing that her father had terminated the trust in 1999 by distributing its funds to her brother.

Core Disputes and Claims

The litigation presented two fundamental questions for the Court to resolve:

1. Existence of the Trust: Did the Burwood Trust still exist? The central issue was whether a payment of approximately AUD $200,000 made by the trustee, George, to his own son, Lindsay, in 1999 constituted a final distribution that terminated the trust, or if it was merely a personal gift from George’s own funds.
2. Trustee’s Indemnity: If the trust was found to be ongoing, to what extent was the retiring trustee (George’s daughter and estate administrator) entitled to be indemnified from the trust fund for the substantial legal costs she had incurred over nearly two decades of litigation related to the estate and the trust?

The First Respondent (the grandson) claimed the trust was extant and sought an account of its assets. The Appellant (George’s daughter) sought a declaration that the trust had been terminated in 1999 and, in the alternative, sought indemnity for her extensive legal expenses.

Chapter 2: Origin of the Case

The seeds of this multi-generational legal battle were sown in 1976 when Hok Njan Tjiong, the family patriarch, decided to make private arrangements for his assets. He purchased a home unit in Burwood and, in a letter to his trusted son George, instructed him to hold the property in George’s name. This arrangement, designed to avoid death duties and manage sensitive family matters, was the genesis of the Burwood Trust. The initial terms were for the unit’s proceeds to support Hok’s wife, Kwat, after his death, with any remainder designated for his mistress.

In 1978, another letter from Hok amended the trust. His relationship with his mistress had ended, and he now directed that after his wife’s needs were met, the remaining funds should provide for his son from that extramarital relationship, or otherwise for any other family members who were in need, at George’s discretion. Hok passed away in 1981, and George assumed his role as trustee of this informal, unrecorded trust.

For years, the arrangement operated quietly. George’s mother, Kwat, lived in the unit until 1994. In 1996, George sold the property for approximately AUD $168,000. In a critical and ultimately fateful decision, he did not create a separate trust account. Instead, he deposited the entire sum into his personal Macquarie Bank account, where it became mixed with his own savings. This act of commingling funds would later become a central issue, blurring the lines between trust property and personal assets.

The defining moment that would become the core of the present dispute occurred in July 1999. George withdrew nearly AUD $200,000 from the mixed account and sent it to his own son, Lindsay, who was facing financial difficulties. He accompanied the payment with a letter instructing secrecy and expressing a profound sense of relief, stating, “Now I can die in peace.”

George himself became incapacitated in 2001 and died in 2004, leaving his estate to his two children, Katrina and Lindsay. His mother, Kwat, the primary beneficiary of the trust’s income, lived until 2006. The existence of the trust itself only came to the wider family’s attention after George’s death, when the foundational letters were discovered. This discovery triggered the first wave of litigation in 2009, brought by another family member, which legally affirmed the existence of the Burwood Trust but left its current status unresolved. More than a decade later, Tzer Chin Chang, a grandson of the original settlor, launched the current proceedings, contending that the trust had never been properly terminated and that its assets, now mingled with George’s estate, must be accounted for. Katrina, as the administrator of her father’s estate, found herself defending her father’s actions from over twenty years prior, arguing that his payment to her brother was the final, decisive act that brought the Burwood Trust to an end.

Chapter 3: Key Evidence and Core Disputes

First Respondent’s Main Evidence and Arguments:

The First Respondent, arguing for the continued existence of the trust, built his case on a legalistic interpretation of the trust’s terms and the absence of clear documentary proof of its termination.

• The 2009 Judgment: He relied heavily on the 2009 Supreme Court decision by Palmer J, which legally established the existence and terms of the Burwood Trust.
• Breach of Trust Argument: A key argument was that George’s mother, Kwat, the primary life tenant, was still alive in 1999. Therefore, any distribution of the trust’s capital to another beneficiary, like Lindsay, would have constituted a breach of trust. It was argued that the Court should presume George intended to act lawfully, meaning the payment must have been a personal gift, not a distribution from the trust.
• Absence of Documentation: The First Respondent emphasized that no contemporaneous document—neither George’s letter to Lindsay nor any bank record—explicitly labelled the 1999 payment as a “distribution from the Burwood Trust.” The link was purely inferential.

Appellant’s Main Evidence and Arguments:

The Appellant constructed a powerful narrative of intent, piecing together circumstantial and oral evidence to argue that her father, George, had consciously terminated the trust.

• Lindsay Tjiong’s Testimony: The cornerstone of the Appellant’s case was the affidavit and oral evidence of her brother, Lindsay. He recounted a crucial telephone conversation with their father, in which George explicitly mentioned having “money set aside for the care of Oma [Kwat],” but concluded that since she was well looked after by other family members, he was “happy for the money to go to [Lindsay].”
• George’s 1999 Letter: The letter accompanying the cheques, while not naming the trust, contained powerful clues. George’s statement that he could now “die in peace” suggested the fulfilment of a significant, long-held obligation, consistent with finalising his duties as trustee for his late father. The instruction for secrecy was also argued to be in line with the private, informal nature of the trust’s creation.
• Comparison of George’s Wills: A subtle but compelling piece of evidence was the difference between George’s 1992 will, which made specific provisions for his mother’s residence in the Burwood property, and his 2001 will. The 2001 will, made after the 1999 payment to Lindsay, contained no reference to the property or any related trust obligations, suggesting the matter had been concluded.
• Equal Treatment of Children: It was argued that if the AUD $200,000 payment was a personal gift to Lindsay, George’s 2001 will would likely have been adjusted to “even up” the inheritance for his daughter, Katrina. The fact he left his estate equally to both children strongly implied the payment to Lindsay came from a separate source—the trust—and was not part of his personal estate.

Core Dispute Points:

1. Intent vs. Formality: Was the Court to be guided by the formal terms of the trust (which would suggest a breach) or by the inferred intention of the trustee based on his words and actions?
2. Weight of Evidence: How should the Court weigh direct oral evidence of a conversation from over 20 years ago against the absence of explicit, contemporaneous documentary proof?
3. Onus of Proof: Who bore the burden of proof? Did the First Respondent need to prove the trust still existed, or did the Appellant need to prove it had been terminated?

Chapter 4: Statements in Affidavits

The affidavits in this case, particularly that of Lindsay Tjiong, were pivotal in transforming a collection of disparate facts into a coherent narrative. While the First Respondent’s case rested on legal documents and the absence of evidence, the Appellant’s case was constructed through sworn testimony that provided context and illuminated the deceased trustee’s state of mind.

Lindsay’s affidavit did more than just recount the 1999 telephone conversation. It established his personal circumstances, including a brain injury and financial struggles, which positioned him as a “family member in need” and thus a legitimate object of the trust’s discretionary power. It framed his father’s 1993 promise to help him buy a property not as a separate personal commitment, but as the precursor to the eventual trust distribution. The affidavit cleverly linked George’s paternal concern with his fiduciary duty, suggesting that helping his son was the most logical and emotionally satisfying way for George to fulfil the “spirit” of his own father’s wishes.

The affidavit effectively provided the missing link that the documents alone could not. It gave meaning to George’s cryptic phrase “Now I can die in peace,” framing it as the closure of a multi-decade family responsibility. By presenting this detailed, personal account, the affidavit invited the Court to look beyond the cold letter of the law and understand the human motivations driving the trustee’s actions. It directly confronted the “breach of trust” argument by providing evidence of George’s reasoning: that his mother’s needs were already met, thereby freeing him, in his mind, to exercise his discretion over the remaining funds.

Chapter 5: Court Orders

Prior to the final judgment in the Court of Appeal, the litigation had proceeded through a multi-stage process in the Supreme Court under Henry J. After the initial hearing, her Honour delivered a first judgment finding that the trust was still in existence. Key orders from that stage included:

• The appointment of new, independent trustees to take over the administration of the Burwood Trust.
• An order directing the new trustees to prepare a detailed report identifying the current value of the trust’s corpus and income, a complex task given the funds had been commingled for over two decades.
• A direction for the report to also identify any claims for indemnity made by the Appellant, as the retiring trustee, for legal costs she had incurred.

Following the submission of the trustees’ report, a second hearing took place to determine the final quantum. This resulted in the final orders of the primary judge:

• An order that the Appellant pay the sum of AUD $638,432 to the new trustees, representing the calculated value of the trust fund after some of her indemnity claims were allowed.

These were the orders that were ultimately appealed and set aside by the Court of Appeal.

Chapter 6: Hearing Scene: Ultimate Showdown of Evidence and Logic

The hearing in the Court of Appeal was not about new evidence, but a meticulous re-examination of the same body of facts that was before the primary judge. The ultimate showdown was a contest of inferences, pitting a strict legal interpretation against a narrative of human intention.

The core confrontation revolved around the primary judge’s decision to prefer the “contemporaneous documents” over Lindsay Tjiong’s oral testimony, citing the frailties of human memory as articulated in the well-known case of Watson v Foxman. The Appellant argued this was a misapplication of the principle. Her counsel contended that Lindsay’s evidence was not contradicted by the documents; rather, it explained them. George’s 1999 letter, with its talk of honouring an “agreement” and finding “peace,” was cryptic on its own. Lindsay’s evidence gave it a logical context that aligned with George’s duties as trustee.

The majority in the Court of Appeal was persuaded by this line of reasoning. They engaged in a holistic review, concluding that the primary judge had erred by compartmentalising the evidence instead of viewing it as a composite picture. The majority found Lindsay’s evidence, which had not been challenged as untruthful in cross-examination, was a crucial piece of the puzzle. It cohered with the change in George’s wills and his otherwise inexplicable decision to maintain an equal inheritance for his children. The majority effectively determined that the cumulative weight of these interconnected pieces of evidence made the inference of a trust distribution far more probable than the alternative of a large personal gift.

In his reasoning, Basten AJA directly addressed the trustee’s state of mind and the informal nature of the arrangement, giving weight to the cultural and familial context. His Honour reasoned that it was entirely plausible that George, as the trusted son, felt he was acting within the spirit of his father’s wishes. The judgment featured a key passage that captured this logic:

“George Tjiong was a medical practitioner. He was clearly trusted by his father… The settlor thus trusted George in relation to matters of family affairs which were closest to him. No evidential basis has been provided to discount that trust. Accordingly, there is no reason to suppose that George Tjiong did not consider it consistent with the spirit of his father’s instructions to provide a home for his own son who was undoubtedly in need and struggling. That being so, the appropriate inference is that he applied the funds he had from his father for that purpose, given that his mother was well taken care of.”

In dissent, Griffiths AJA supported the primary judge’s more cautious approach. He argued that the trial judge was correct to be wary of oral evidence of a conversation that occurred over two decades earlier and to place greater reliance on what the documents did, and did not, say. His Honour reasoned that the lack of any explicit mention of the trust in George’s 1999 letter was significant, and that the alternative explanation—that George was fulfilling a personal promise to his son—was equally, if not more, plausible. His dissent underscored the classic judicial tension between documentary certainty and the persuasive power of human testimony.

Chapter 7: Final Judgment of the Court

The Court of Appeal, by a majority decision (Basten AJA and Price AJA; Griffiths AJA dissenting), allowed the appeal.

The Court made the following key orders:

1. The appeal was allowed, and the orders made by the primary judge on 16 August 2022 and 9 February 2024 were set aside.
2. The Court made a formal declaration that the Burwood Trust, created by Hok Njan Tjiong, was determined by a distribution made by the trustee, George Tjiong, to his son Lindsay Tjiong on 19 July 1999.
3. The First Respondent (the original plaintiff) was ordered to pay the Appellant’s (the original defendant’s) costs of both the trial and the appeal.

This outcome represented a complete victory for the Appellant, vindicating her long-held position that the trust had ceased to exist more than two decades prior and relieving her of the obligation to pay over AUD $600,000.

Chapter 8: In-depth Analysis of the Judgment: How Law and Evidence Lay the Foundation for Victory

Special Analysis

The jurisprudential value of this judgment lies in its sophisticated treatment of appellate review concerning factual inferences. It serves as a crucial authority on how an appellate court should approach a trial judge’s findings when they are not based on witness credibility, but on the weighing of undisputed facts and competing inferences. The majority demonstrated a willingness to intervene where they concluded the trial judge had given insufficient weight to a cohesive body of circumstantial evidence in favour of the absence of a single “smoking gun” document. The case powerfully illustrates that a narrative constructed from multiple, consistent evidentiary threads can be more persuasive than a legalistic argument based on documentary gaps. It refines the application of the Watson v Foxman principle, clarifying that it is a caution against unreliable memory, not a rule to automatically discount credible oral evidence that contextualises and explains contemporaneous documents.

Judgment Points

A noteworthy aspect of the majority’s reasoning was its focus on the “spirit” of the trust over its strict, literal terms. The trust was created by informal family letters, not a formal deed drafted by lawyers. The Court recognised this context, inferring that George likely saw his primary duty as ensuring his mother was cared for, and once he was satisfied of that, he felt empowered to exercise his discretion for other family members in need. The fact that this occurred before his mother’s death—a technical breach—was viewed as less significant than his overarching intention to finally execute his father’s wishes. This pragmatic approach highlights the judiciary’s ability to look beyond rigid legal formalities to ascertain the true substance of informal family arrangements.

Legal Basis

The decision did not turn on the interpretation of a specific statute. Instead, it was grounded in fundamental common law principles of evidence, trusts, and appellate review. The key legal authorities implicitly and explicitly engaged were those governing the duties of an appellate court when reviewing findings of fact, such as Warren v Coombes and Fox v Percy. The Court’s task was to determine if the primary judge’s conclusion was “wrong” based on the established evidence, and the majority found that it was, due to an error in the process of inference and the weighing of different types of evidence.

Evidence Chain

The Appellant’s victory was built on a meticulously constructed chain of evidence where each link reinforced the next:

1. The Promise (1993): George promises to help his struggling son, Lindsay.
2. The Need: Lindsay is identified as a “family member in need,” making him a valid object of the trust’s power.
3. The Conversation (1999): George explicitly links the payment to money “set aside for Oma,” directly connecting it to the trust’s purpose.
4. The Payment & Letter (1999): The large payment is made, and the accompanying letter’s statement “Now I can die in peace” provides powerful emotional evidence of the fulfilment of a major life obligation.
5. The Change in Wills (1992 vs. 2001): The removal of any reference to the trust obligation in the later will corroborates the idea that the matter was finalised.
6. The Equal Inheritance: The maintenance of an equal split of his personal estate between his children in the 2001 will makes logical sense only if the AUD $200,000 payment to Lindsay was not from his personal funds.

This interconnected chain created a compelling narrative of intent that the Court found more probable than the alternative.

Judicial Original Quotation

The majority’s reasoning is powerfully encapsulated in the pragmatic and context-sensitive analysis of the trustee’s likely state of mind. Basten AJA’s conclusion demonstrates a departure from a purely legalistic assessment, focusing instead on the human and familial realities of the situation:

“Accordingly, there is no reason to suppose that George Tjiong did not consider it consistent with the spirit of his father’s instructions to provide a home for his own son who was undoubtedly in need and struggling. That being so, the appropriate inference is that he applied the funds he had from his father for that purpose, given that his mother was well taken care of. He may have been mistaken in believing he could make such an assumption in respect of his mother, but he was not to know in 1999 that she would outlive him.”

This passage is determinative because it shows the Court prioritising the trustee’s inferred good-faith intention to fulfil the trust’s purpose over a strict adherence to its temporal sequence. It acknowledges the informal nature of the trust and judges the trustee’s actions based on the practical realities and familial duties as he likely perceived them at the time.

Analysis of the Losing Party’s Failure

The First Respondent’s case ultimately failed for several key reasons. Firstly, it placed excessive reliance on the argument that any distribution before the death of the life tenant was a breach of trust, and therefore could not have been a valid trust distribution. The Court looked past this technicality to the trustee’s underlying intent. Secondly, the case was built on an absence of evidence—the lack of a document explicitly saying “this is a distribution of the Burwood Trust”—rather than a positive alternative narrative. This negative case was not strong enough to withstand the compelling chain of circumstantial evidence presented by the Appellant. Finally, the significant delay of over two decades in bringing the claim meant that oral testimony was limited and documentary records were sparse, placing the plaintiff at a considerable forensic disadvantage from the outset.

Implications

1. Document Everything: Informal, letter-based family trust arrangements are a recipe for future conflict. A formally drafted trust deed with clear terms would have prevented decades of costly litigation.
2. Trustees Must Not Commingle Funds: The single act of depositing trust funds into a personal account was the foundational error that created the ambiguity and enabled this dispute. Trustees have a strict duty to keep trust assets separate.
3. Delay Can Be Fatal to a Claim: Waiting over 20 years to litigate a trust issue creates enormous evidentiary hurdles. Memories fade, documents are lost, and courts may be more inclined to infer that matters were resolved long ago.
4. A Coherent Narrative Can Triumph Over Documentary Gaps: This case proves that a compelling story, backed by a logical chain of circumstantial and oral evidence, can succeed even without a “smoking gun” document. Legal strategy is not just about pointing to the law, but about building the most plausible explanation of events.
5. The “Spirit” of an Arrangement Matters: In disputes over informal family arrangements, courts may look beyond strict legal technicalities to understand and give effect to the underlying intentions and familial context of the parties.

Q&A Session

1. Why was the Court of Appeal able to overturn the trial judge’s decision without any new evidence?

The Court of Appeal’s role is not just to look for errors of law, but also to review how the trial judge drew inferences from the established facts. In this case, the majority felt the trial judge had made an error in her reasoning process by giving too little weight to the combined force of Lindsay’s testimony and the circumstantial evidence (the wills, the letter), and too much weight to the absence of a specific document. Because this was an error of inference, not a finding based on witness credibility, the appellate court was in just as good a position to draw its own conclusions from the evidence.

2. Wasn’t it a clear breach of trust for George to pay his son before his mother, the primary beneficiary, had passed away?

Technically, it could be viewed as a breach. However, the Court of Appeal’s majority focused on a different question: what was George’s intention when he made the payment? They concluded his intention was to distribute the trust funds. The evidence suggested George believed his mother’s needs were adequately met by other family members, allowing him to exercise his discretion. Given the informal nature of the trust, the Court prioritised the substance of his action (fulfilling the trust’s purpose for a needy family member) over the procedural timing.

3. What happens to the extensive analysis of the Appellant’s indemnity claims for her legal costs?

Because the Court of Appeal found that the trust was terminated in 1999, it no longer exists as a fund from which the Appellant could be indemnified. Therefore, all the legal arguments and the primary judge’s calculations regarding her right to indemnity for costs incurred in the 2000s and 2010s became moot. The analysis provided by the judges on this point is now effectively an academic discussion of what would have been the correct approach if the trust had still existed.

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[Appendix: Reference for Comparable Case Judgments and Practical Guidelines]

1. Practical Positioning of This Case

• Case Subtype: Wills, Estates & Succession Law – Termination of an Informal Family Trust
• Judgment Nature Definition: Final Judgment

2. Self-examination of Core Statutory Elements

Core Test (Validity of a Trust)

• Certainty of Intention: Was there a clear intention to create a trust? In this case, the letters from Hok to George were held to demonstrate this intention.
• Certainty of Subject Matter: Is the trust property clearly identified? Here, it was initially the Burwood unit and later the net proceeds of its sale (AUD $168,331.06). The commingling of funds complicated, but did not destroy, the certainty of the subject matter.
• Certainty of Objects: Are the beneficiaries (the “objects”) clearly identified? The 1978 letter defined the objects as Hok’s wife for life, then his son Roy if in need, and otherwise “others in the family who need the money.” This was deemed sufficiently certain for a discretionary trust.

Core Test (Family Provision Claims)

While this case was not a family provision claim, the principles are relevant to the context of estate litigation.

• Eligibility: Is the claimant an “eligible person” under the relevant state’s Succession Act (e.g., spouse, de facto partner, child)? In this case, the beneficiaries of the trust were defined by the trust instrument itself.
• Adequate Provision: Has the deceased failed to make “adequate provision” for the claimant’s proper maintenance, education, or advancement in life?
• Factors for Consideration: The Court considers the claimant’s financial position, the size of the estate, the relationship between the claimant and the deceased, and any obligations the deceased had to the claimant and other beneficiaries.

3. Equitable Remedies and Alternative Claims

When dealing with informal family arrangements where written agreements are lacking, equitable doctrines are crucial.

Promissory / Proprietary Estoppel:

• Application: If a family member makes a promise (e.g., “this house will be yours when I die”) and another person acts on that promise to their detriment (e.g., by spending money on renovations or providing years of unpaid care), Equity may enforce the promise even without a formal contract.
• Core Test:
  • Did one party make a clear and unequivocal representation or promise?
  • Did the other party reasonably rely on that promise and act to their detriment?
  • Would it be unconscionable (grossly unfair) for the first party to go back on their word?
• Result Reference: In this case, while not a direct issue, George’s 1993 promise to Lindsay could have potentially grounded an estoppel claim if the trust argument had failed, though it would have been against George’s estate personally.

Unjust Enrichment / Constructive Trust:

• Application: This applies where one person has been unjustly enriched at another’s expense. The Court can declare that an asset is held on a “constructive trust” for the person who has been unfairly deprived.
• Core Test:
  • Has the defendant been enriched (received a benefit)?
  • Was the enrichment at the claimant’s expense?
  • Is it “unjust” for the defendant to retain the benefit?
  • Are there any defences available (e.g., the claimant intended it as a gift)?
• Result Reference: This is often used in family property disputes where one partner’s name is not on the title but they have made significant financial or non-financial contributions.

4. Access Thresholds and Exceptional Circumstances

Regular Thresholds:

• Limitation Periods: For claims based on a breach of trust, limitation periods can be complex. While general civil claims often have a 6-year limit from the date the cause of action accrues, actions against a trustee for a fraudulent breach of trust or to recover trust property may have no limitation period. However, long delays can still lead to a defence of laches (unreasonable delay causing prejudice).
• Family Provision Claims: Strict time limits apply, often 12 months from the date of death, though extensions can be granted in certain circumstances.

Exceptional Channels (Crucial):

• Fraudulent Concealment: If a trustee fraudulently conceals a breach of trust, the limitation period may not begin to run until the beneficiary discovers or could have reasonably discovered the breach.
• Laches and Acquiescence: Even if there is no statutory time limit, a beneficiary who is aware of a breach of trust and does nothing for an unreasonably long time may be deemed to have acquiesced and may be barred from bringing a claim.

Suggestion: The success of the Appellant in this case, despite the events occurring over 20 years ago, shows that the merits of the evidence can sometimes overcome issues of delay, especially in complex family and trust matters. However, delaying a claim always carries immense forensic risk.

5. Guidelines for Judicial and Legal Citation

Citation Angle:

This case is a significant authority on the principles of appellate review of factual inferences and the weighing of oral versus documentary evidence in trust disputes. It should be cited in matters where:

• A trial judge’s finding of fact is challenged on the basis of an error in the inferential process, rather than a finding on witness credibility.
• The intention of a party to an informal arrangement must be inferred from a combination of old conversations, ambiguous documents, and subsequent conduct.
• An argument is being made about the proper application of the cautionary principle in Watson v Foxman regarding witness memory.

Citation Method:

• As Positive Support: For a party relying on circumstantial and oral evidence to prove an intention that is not explicitly recorded in documents, this case can be cited to argue that the Court must consider the “composite picture” and that a coherent narrative can be sufficient to discharge the burden of proof.
• As a Distinguishing Reference: An opposing party could seek to distinguish this case by arguing that, unlike in Tjiong, the oral evidence in the current matter is directly contradicted by contemporaneous documents, or that the witness providing the oral evidence was found to be unreliable.

Anonymisation Rule:

When citing, refer to the parties by their procedural titles: the Appellant (the administrator of the trustee’s estate) and the First Respondent (the beneficiary claiming the trust was extant).

Conclusion

Everyone needs to understand the law and see the world through the lens of law. The in-depth analysis of this authentic judgment is intended to help everyone gradually establish a new legal mindset: True self-protection stems from the early understanding and mastery of legal rules.

Disclaimer

This article is based on the study and analysis of the public judgment of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (Tjiong v Chang [2025] NSWCA 25), aimed at promoting legal research and public understanding. The citation of relevant judgment content is limited to the scope of fair dealing for the purposes of legal research, comment, and information sharing.

The analysis, structural arrangement, and expression of views contained in this article are the original content of the author, and the copyright belongs to the author and this platform. This article does not constitute legal advice, nor should it be regarded as legal advice for any specific situation.

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