Land Tax Principal Place of Residence Exemption for Jointly Owned Homes: When does the “Unoccupied but Intended to be the Owner’s Home” Concession Fail, and can an Attorney Challenge Assessments for a Property They Do Not Own?

Based on the authentic Australian judicial case HLQ v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2025] NSWCATAD 296, this article disassembles the Court’s judgment process regarding evidence and law. It transforms complex judicial reasoning into clear, understandable key point analyses, helping readers identify the core of the dispute, understand the judgment logic, make more rational litigation choices, and providing case resources for practical research to readers of all backgrounds.

Chapter 1: Case Overview and Core Disputes

Basic Information

Court of Hearing: New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal, Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division

Presiding Judge: S Higgins, Senior Member

Cause of Action: Merits review of land tax reassessments concerning the principal place of residence exemption, including the concession for unoccupied land intended to become a principal place of residence, and a preliminary standing issue under the taxation review framework

Judgment Date: 24 November 2025

Core Keywords:

Keyword 1: Authentic Judgment Case
Keyword 2: Land tax reassessment
Keyword 3: Principal place of residence exemption
Keyword 4: Clause 6 Schedule 1A Land Tax Management Act 1956 (NSW)
Keyword 5: Joint ownership and “one owner benefits all” exemption structure
Keyword 6: Standing and powers of attorney in administrative review

Background

This case arose from two land tax reassessments issued after a review of exemptions previously applied at a “$0” level. Two residential properties in New South Wales were held in different ownership structures: one property was jointly owned by the Applicant, the Applicant’s spouse, and two adult children (and spouses), each holding equal shares; the other was owned by the Applicant’s spouse and one adult child in unequal shares. The Respondent had earlier applied the principal place of residence exemption through a special concession for “unoccupied land intended to be the owner’s principal place of residence”. Years later, after reviewing whether the legal requirements had actually been met for each relevant land tax year, the Respondent revoked the previously applied concession and issued reassessments.

The Applicant, self-represented, framed the dispute as one of practical fairness and notice: the Applicant asserted that no earlier payment demands had been received, and that land tax could only be paid from rent, making a later reassessment for earlier years “extremely unfair”. The Respondent framed the matter as a statutory question with an onus on the taxpayer to prove the assessment is incorrect, and emphasised that fairness does not supply a general discretion to override clear legislative requirements.

Core Disputes and Claims

There were two core legal fights, operating at different levels.

1. Substantive land tax issue (both properties, though ultimately decided on merits only for one property): Whether the statutory conditions in clause 6 of Schedule 1A of the Land Tax Management Act 1956 (NSW) were satisfied for each of the 2022, 2023 and 2024 land tax years, such that the principal place of residence exemption applied by operation of the “unoccupied but intended principal place of residence” concession.

2. Threshold standing issue (second property): Whether the Applicant, who was not an owner of one property, could nonetheless commence merits review proceedings as an “interested person” or “taxpayer” by relying on general powers of attorney granted by the actual owners, even though the owners did not wish to be parties and the Applicant insisted the Applicant alone was the applicant.

Relief sought by Applicant: Revocation of the reassessments and restoration of the exemption treatment (or effectively, a finding that the reassessments were wrong), as well as practical recognition that the properties could not be rented if the concession was to remain.

Relief sought by Respondent: Confirmation of the reassessment for the jointly owned property, dismissal of the application regarding the other property for lack of standing, and rejection of the fairness arguments as legally irrelevant.

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Chapter 2: Origin of the Case

The story begins decades earlier with a family’s property holdings evolving over time, then colliding with an exemption regime that is strict about both occupancy and the evidence needed to prove “intention”.

The Applicant and the Applicant’s spouse purchased a home in the mid-1990s that served as their principal place of residence for many years. Around the same period, a second property was purchased by the spouse and one adult child, with ownership later adjusted so the spouse held a smaller share and the adult child held the majority share. Years later, a third property was acquired in equal shares by the Applicant, spouse, and two adult children. Another residential property was also acquired with additional related persons.

Over time, both adult children left Australia and remained overseas for many years. The spouse also left Australia for an extended period and later returned. Tenants vacated two of the properties in 2021 (one in March and one in April), leaving them vacant for periods. Against that background, the family sought the benefit of the clause 6 concession: a mechanism that can treat unoccupied land as if it were the owner’s principal place of residence where the owner intends to move in and the land is unoccupied because necessary building or other works are intended or underway to facilitate that occupation.

Here is the practical pressure point that foreshadowed litigation: the concession rewards vacancy plus genuine, evidenced intention and progress toward making the property a home. The Applicant’s case, however, was built around a different practical reality: the Applicant repeatedly asserted that rent was needed to fund building works, and that the properties needed to be leased to generate cashflow. That position collides with the concession’s foundational requirement that the land be unoccupied and, if works have commenced, that no income be derived since commencement.

The decisive moment arrived in October 2024 when the Respondent commenced a review of the concession treatment for the relevant years. The Applicant responded with explanations that the adult children “yearned” to return, that the properties required extensive repairs, and that COVID-19 travel restrictions and vaccination concerns were said to have impeded return and progress. Shortly thereafter, reassessments were issued for multiple land tax years, and the Applicant’s objection was disallowed. The matter then moved into NCAT’s merits review jurisdiction.

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Chapter 3: Key Evidence and Core Disputes

Applicant’s Main Evidence and Arguments

1. Email communications to the Respondent during the review period
   • The Applicant sent emails on multiple dates in October and November 2024. The key factual themes were consistent:
     • Both properties were said to be vacant for long periods after tenants vacated.
     • The adult children were said to intend to return to Australia with their families and occupy the properties as homes.
     • The properties were said to require substantial repairs and possibly second-storey additions to accommodate families.
     • COVID-19 travel restrictions and vaccination concerns were said to have delayed return and works.
2. Powers of attorney documents
   • The Applicant produced registered general powers of attorney made years earlier, appointing the Applicant as attorney for the spouse and for the adult children.
3. Submissions, largely in email form, in the Tribunal process
   • The Applicant’s submissions emphasised:
     • Lack of earlier “payment requirement” notifications.
     • Inability to afford land tax without rental income.
     • A belief that the exemption had been accepted and should not later be unwound for prior years.
     • A legal misunderstanding about the timing of the clause 6 four-year period, asserting it commenced later than it did and therefore allowed more time before occupation was required.
4. Narrative assertions of intention
   • Central to the Applicant’s case was the assertion that an adult child intended to return and occupy each property, and that building works were contemplated to enable that.

Respondent’s Main Evidence and Arguments

1. Section 58 documents and hearing book
   • The Respondent relied on the documentary record used for merits review, including earlier exemption grants, review communications, property occupancy information, and the statutory framework.
2. Statutory construction and onus
   • The Respondent relied on:
     • The taxpayer’s onus to prove the assessment is incorrect on the balance of probabilities.
     • The objective test for “intention” in clause 6.
     • The clause 6 requirements of unoccupied land and progress toward building or other works.
     • The limited relevance of fairness where a statute is clear.
3. Standing argument for the property the Applicant did not own
   • The Respondent argued:
     • Only a “taxpayer” (as defined) may seek external review under the relevant enabling legislation.
     • An attorney cannot commence proceedings contrary to the principal’s wishes, and the Applicant’s own communications made clear the owners did not wish to be applicants.

Core Dispute Points

1. Standing: Can a non-owner attorney apply for merits review when the owners refuse to be parties, and the attorney insists the attorney alone is the applicant?

2. Clause 6 threshold: Was the property truly “unoccupied” during the relevant tax years, or was there use and occupation inconsistent with the statutory definition?

3. Objective intention: Is there sufficient material to objectively establish the relevant owner’s intention to return and occupy as a principal place of residence?

4. Works and “significant steps”: By the end of the first tax year of the clause 6 period, were building works commenced or were significant steps taken to enable works to commence?

5. Misconception of timing: When did the clause 6 four-tax-year period start on these facts?

6. Reassessment and “retrospectivity”: Are reassessments for earlier land tax years “retrospective” in a legally meaningful sense, or simply reassessments authorised by the legislative scheme?

7. Fairness: Can perceived unfairness supply a basis to set aside assessments where the statute confers no general discretion?

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Chapter 4: Statements in Affidavits

This proceeding is notable for what it did not contain: formal sworn affidavit evidence from the critical persons whose intentions mattered most.

The Applicant’s litigation strategy relied heavily on informal written communications, particularly emails, rather than sworn statements from the adult children. That strategy had a predictable vulnerability in a clause 6 case: the statutory focus is not merely on what an attorney asserts, but on whether the Court or Tribunal can objectively assess the relevant owner’s intention and the progress of works. Emails that repeat a conclusion—“the owner intends to return”—do not necessarily provide the factual foundation that allows objective assessment.

The Respondent’s approach, by contrast, was structurally aligned with the statutory tests. The Respondent did not need to prove the Applicant wrong; the Respondent needed only to point to the absence of evidence satisfying each element, because the onus remained on the taxpayer to establish that the assessment was incorrect.

The procedural directions about evidence in the Tribunal, including deadlines for evidence and submissions, were strategically important. In an administrative merits review, failure to file coherent evidentiary material does not merely weaken a case; it can make it impossible for the Tribunal to reach the statutory state of satisfaction required to grant relief. Here, the Tribunal highlighted that the Applicant had ample opportunity to provide material and yet did not provide evidence capable of supporting an objective assessment of intention and steps toward works.

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Chapter 5: Court Orders

Before the final hearing, the Tribunal made procedural arrangements typical of merits review proceedings, including timetables for evidence and submissions and the compilation of the Respondent’s section 58 material and hearing book. A key procedural feature was the Tribunal’s management of two preliminary issues that were raised by the Respondent: standing in relation to the non-owned property and whether other owners of the jointly owned property should be joined. Those issues were reserved to be decided with the substantive merits after the hearing.

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Chapter 6: Hearing Scene: Ultimate Showdown of Evidence and Logic

The hearing was not a theatrical cross-examination in the way of a jury trial. The “ultimate showdown” here was the collision between statutory elements and an evidentiary record built largely from assertions.

Process Reconstruction: Live Restoration

The Applicant’s case depended on persuading the Tribunal that the clause 6 conditions were met year after year. That required a disciplined evidentiary chain:

• the land was unoccupied as defined;
• it was unoccupied because of intended or ongoing works necessary to facilitate intended occupation as a principal place of residence;
• intention was real and objectively demonstrable; and
• by the end of the first year, works had commenced or significant steps had been taken to enable them to commence.

At the hearing, the Applicant advanced explanations for delay: COVID-19 restrictions, health concerns about vaccination, and practical impediments like inability to obtain loans without being physically present. The Respondent pressed the statutory structure: intention must be objectively assessed, unoccupied means not used or occupied for any purpose, and the scheme contains specific timing and progress requirements.

The most damaging logical break for the Applicant was that the Applicant’s own narrative contained facts inconsistent with “unoccupied land”. For one property, the Applicant stated that the Applicant moved into it for nearly six months in early 2022 as a temporary measure. Even if that occupancy was not claimed as the Applicant’s principal place of residence, it was still “use and occupation” of the land, which defeats the premise that the land was unoccupied for any purpose in that year.

Core Evidence Confrontation

The decisive confrontations were not about minor inconsistencies; they were about whether the evidence satisfied the legal tests.

1. The “unoccupied” requirement versus actual use
   • If the property was occupied by anyone for any purpose, it was not “unoccupied land” within the statutory definition for clause 6 purposes.
2. Objective intention versus asserted intention
   • The Tribunal required material capable of objectively demonstrating the adult child’s intention to return and occupy, including circumstances overseas and steps taken to relocate, not merely an attorney’s assertion.
3. Works and significant steps
   • The Applicant conceded that no works commenced and no significant steps were taken within the required timeframe, and attempted to justify this by reference to alleged exceptional circumstances.

Judicial Reasoning: How the facts drove the result

Two judicial moves were determinative.

First, the Tribunal treated “intention” as an objective question requiring evidence that explains the relevant owner’s circumstances and concrete steps. Mere aspiration is not enough. The Tribunal applied the accepted principle that intention under clause 6 is not gauged subjectively but objectively, having regard to all circumstances.

Second, the Tribunal applied the statutory architecture strictly: if any requirement fails in any relevant year, the exemption applied by operation of clause 6 is revoked and is taken not to have applied, requiring reassessment.

The Tribunal’s reasoning can be captured by the following core statement, which shows the statutory discipline of the decision.

“Other than the assertion of the applicant … there is an absence of any material before the Tribunal on which the assertion could be objectively assessed.”

This statement was determinative because clause 6 relief turns on the Tribunal being satisfied of statutory facts. Without material from or about the relevant owner, the Tribunal could not be satisfied that intention existed in the legally required sense.

A second statement crystallised the incompatibility between the Applicant’s practical funding argument and the concession’s vacancy requirement.

“The applicants, use and occupation of the Property … was inconsistent with this. Therefore, Property A was not unoccupied, as required … for the 2022 land tax year.”

This was determinative because it identifies a direct factual contradiction: the concession is available only for unoccupied land, and the Applicant’s own evidence supplied occupation.

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Chapter 7: Final Judgment of the Court

The Tribunal made the following outcomes:

1. A non-disclosure order was made prohibiting publication of identifying details of the Applicant, the Applicant’s spouse, adult children, and other related persons identified in the material.

2. The land tax assessment for the jointly owned property was confirmed.

3. The application was otherwise dismissed, including dismissal of the proceeding about the property the Applicant did not own, on the basis that the Applicant lacked standing as a relevant taxpayer or interested person for that property.

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Chapter 8: In-depth Analysis of the Judgment: How Law and Evidence Lay the Foundation for Victory

Special Analysis

This judgment is a textbook demonstration of how tax exemptions that look flexible in everyday language are, in practice, governed by strict statutory preconditions and an unforgiving evidentiary burden.

Many ordinary readers hear “intended principal place of residence” and assume that sincere intention plus hardship should be enough. This case shows that the legal question is narrower and more technical: the law requires that the land be unoccupied, that it be unoccupied because of works necessary to facilitate the intended use, and that progress toward those works be shown within a defined timeline. It also shows that “fairness” arguments can be legally irrelevant where Parliament has chosen a rigid mechanism.

Equally important is the procedural lesson: merits review is not a negotiation. The Tribunal’s task is to reach the correct and preferable decision under the statute on the evidence. If key evidence is missing, the Tribunal cannot fill the gaps with sympathy or assumptions.

Finally, the standing analysis reveals a subtle but practical constraint on attorneys: a power of attorney can authorise acts, but the Tribunal will not treat an attorney as an appropriate surrogate applicant where the principals refuse to be parties and the attorney frames the proceeding as personal.

Judgment Points

1. The statutory concept of “unoccupied land” is absolute in its language and is not softened by temporary living arrangements. If someone occupies the property for any purpose, the land is not “unoccupied” for that period.

2. Clause 6 “intention” is assessed objectively. The Tribunal will look for concrete, verifiable circumstances and steps, not just an assertion that someone intends to return.

3. The four-tax-year period is triggered by statutory definitions of “tax year” and by the year in which the prior occupier ceased to use the land for residential purposes. Misreading the commencement date can lead to fatal compliance errors.

4. Clause 6 imposes an early checkpoint: by the end of the first relevant tax year, works must have physically commenced or significant steps must have been taken to enable commencement.

5. The Tribunal and the Respondent lack a general discretion to decide based on fairness. The statute’s operation can be harsh in practical effect, but that harshness is not, by itself, a legal ground to set aside an assessment.

6. Reassessment is not the same as unlawful retrospectivity. If the statute authorises reassessment and the conditions for revocation are met, the assessment is made when issued, even if it calculates liability for earlier tax years.

7. Standing in taxation merits review is tethered to the statutory definition of “taxpayer” and “interested person”. If a person is not assessed and is not liable, they may not have standing, even if they hold a power of attorney.

Legal Basis

The decision turned on the interaction of three legislative frameworks.

1. Land Tax Management Act 1956 (NSW)
   • Section 7: land tax is levied and paid on taxable land unless exempt.
   • Section 8: land tax is charged on land owned at midnight on 31 December preceding the year.
   • Section 10(1)(r): principal place of residence exemption via Schedule 1A.
   • Section 12 and Gazette order mechanism: obligations to lodge returns, including variation returns where an exemption’s conditions are not fulfilled.
   • Schedule 1A clause 2: principal place of residence exemption structure, including effect for joint owners.
   • Schedule 1A clause 6: concession for unoccupied land intended to be principal place of residence, including “unoccupied land” definition, the four-year period, revocation and reassessment consequences, and the extension mechanism in clause 6(7A).
2. Taxation Administration Act 1996 (NSW)
   • Section 86: objections.
   • Section 96: right to seek administrative review by a taxpayer.
   • Section 100(3): onus on the applicant to prove the assessment is incorrect.
   • Sections 8–9, 11, 14: assessment and reassessment powers and notice requirements; debt consequences for unpaid tax.
3. Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) and Taxation Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW)
   • Jurisdiction and the Tribunal’s role to reach the correct and preferable decision, and standing concepts as “interested person” under enabling legislation.

A critical doctrinal hinge was the principle that clause 6 intention is objectively assessed: FSX v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2003] NSWCATAD 219.

A second hinge was the proposition that fairness is not a freestanding discretion in this statutory setting: Gunasti v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2012] NSWADT 218; Hashim v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2020] NSWCATAD 67; Nishaharan v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2025] NSWCATAD 35.

Evidence Chain

The Tribunal’s “Conclusion = Evidence + Statutory Provisions” reasoning can be reconstructed through an evidence chain that highlights precisely where the Applicant’s case broke.

Victory Point 1: Identify the correct statutory question, not the fairness narrative
– Statutory provisions: TA Act section 100(3); LTM Act Schedule 1A clause 6.
– Evidence needed: facts proving each clause 6 element for each tax year.
– What happened: the Applicant focused on lack of notice and hardship, but those facts do not prove clause 6 elements.
– Why it mattered: under the onus provision, the assessment stands unless statutory facts are proved.

Victory Point 2: “Unoccupied land” means no use or occupation for any purpose
– Statutory provisions: LTM Act Schedule 1A clause 6(8) definition; clause 6(1)–(2).
– Evidence: the Applicant’s account of occupying a property for almost six months in early 2022.
– Legal consequence: that year cannot satisfy “unoccupied land”; the concession fails for that year, and revocation mechanisms are triggered.
– Practical explanation: if you sleep in the house, store belongings there, or otherwise live there even temporarily, the law treats it as occupied.

Victory Point 3: Objective intention is not proved by an attorney’s assurance
– Statutory provisions: LTM Act Schedule 1A clause 6(1); interpretive approach endorsed in FSX.
– Evidence required: concrete material about the owner’s circumstances overseas, reasons for return, and steps taken to relocate and occupy.
– Record gap: no sworn statement, no detailed plan, no relocation steps, no credible timeline grounded in evidence.
– Tribunal’s logical move: absence of objectively assessable material means the Tribunal cannot be satisfied.

Victory Point 4: “Unoccupied because of works” requires more than a general claim of future renovations
– Statutory provisions: clause 6(2)(a).
– Evidence required: what works were necessary, what was planned, why those works were necessary to facilitate intended occupation, and some link between vacancy and the works plan.
– Record gap: the extent of repairs and the necessity of proposed additions were not evidenced in a way that enabled objective assessment.
– Practical translation: saying “it needs lots of repairs” is not the same as proving “works necessary to facilitate the intended occupation” under a statutory test.

Victory Point 5: The “first-year checkpoint” is a statutory gatekeeper
– Statutory provisions: clause 6(4)(a)–(b).
– Evidence required: by the end of the first of the four relevant tax years, works commenced or significant steps were taken to enable commencement.
– Concession: the Applicant accepted no works commenced and no significant steps were taken.
– Legal consequence: the statute treats the concession as not applying and requires reassessment.
– Why this is counter-intuitive: many people assume that an intention-based concession is forgiving about delay. This clause is designed to prevent indefinite vacancy claimed as exempt without real progress.

Victory Point 6: Misconstruing the four-year period destroys compliance strategy
– Statutory provisions: clause 6(3)(b); LTM Act definition of “tax year”.
– Tribunal’s finding: the four-year period began in the land tax year immediately following the year tenants ceased occupation, which on the facts meant the period began in 2022 and covered 2022–2025.
– Practical effect: the Applicant’s belief that more time remained was legally wrong, leading to a strategy (doing nothing now, rely on later occupation) that did not meet clause 6’s early checkpoint.

Victory Point 7: “Exceptional circumstances” extension is narrow and evidence-heavy
– Statutory provisions: clause 6(7A)(a)–(c).
– Evidence required: a delay in completion of necessary works, primarily due to exceptional circumstances beyond the owner’s control, that could not reasonably have been avoided.
– Tribunal’s approach: the asserted COVID-19 travel restrictions were not treated as establishing the necessary causal connection to a delay in completion of works, and the broader statutory requirements still had to be met year by year.
– Practical translation: even if a global event disrupts life, the owner still needs evidence of works plans and steps, and must show why delay was unavoidable within the statutory framing.

Victory Point 8: Reassessment is authorised and is not unlawful “retrospective” taxation
– Statutory provisions: TA Act sections 9 and 14; LTM Act Schedule 1A clause 6(6A).
– Evidence: review undertaken in October 2024, reassessments issued 29 November 2024.
– Tribunal’s reasoning: assessments were made when issued; the amounts related to earlier years because the exemption was taken not to have applied once conditions were not met.
– Practical translation: if you receive a reassessment now, you are paying in response to the reassessment notice now, even if it recalculates earlier-year liability.

Judicial Original Quotation

The Court’s reasoning was driven by evidentiary absence and statutory structure, expressed sharply in passages like these.

“It is accepted that the requirement concerning ‘intention’ … is not to be gauged subjectively but objectively having regard to all the circumstances of the case …”

This was determinative because it defines what kind of proof matters. A sincere belief or family hope is not enough; the Tribunal must be able to evaluate intention using objective circumstances.

“Other than the assertion of the applicant … there is an absence of any material before the Tribunal on which the assertion could be objectively assessed.”

This was determinative because it explains why the Applicant could not discharge the onus. Without evidence about the relevant owner’s life, plans, and steps, the Tribunal could not reach the statutory satisfaction needed for clause 6.

“The applicants, use and occupation … was inconsistent with this. Therefore, [the property] was not unoccupied, as required … for the 2022 land tax year.”

This was determinative because it identifies a direct statutory failure. Once “unoccupied” fails, the concession collapses for that year and revocation flows.

Analysis of the Losing Party’s Failure

The Applicant’s failure was not a single mistake; it was a chain of mismatches between legal elements and proof.

1. Misalignment of argument to the legal test
   The Applicant argued fairness, notice, and affordability. Those themes do not answer clause 6’s elements.

2. Evidentiary deficit on intention
   The relevant intention was that of an overseas owner, yet the record lacked direct or detailed material about that owner’s circumstances and steps.

3. Conceded lack of works and significant steps
   Clause 6(4) imposes a stringent checkpoint. The Applicant effectively conceded non-compliance.

4. Occupation inconsistent with “unoccupied land”
   Temporary occupation defeated the definition in at least one critical year.

5. Strategic contradiction about renting
   The Applicant’s belief that the Respondent “prevented” renting was legally incorrect. The law did not prevent renting; it imposed a consequence for renting: loss of the concession.

6. Misunderstanding of the four-year period start date
   This misunderstanding appears to have driven a “wait and see” approach that did not satisfy the early checkpoint.

7. Standing failure for the non-owned property
   The Applicant insisted on being the sole applicant while stating the owners refused to be parties, undermining the ability to bring the proceeding on their behalf.

Implications

1. If you claim an exemption that depends on intention, treat it like a project with a paper trail. Intention in law is proven by actions, documents, and steps, not by heartfelt statements.

2. The most expensive mistake is silence. If the conditions of an exemption change, the safest course is to notify the revenue authority through the correct return or variation process, because later reassessment risk tends to increase when the record shows no proactive correction.

3. A concession for an unoccupied home is not a reward for vacancy; it is a temporary bridge to genuine occupation. If the bridge does not lead anywhere—no works, no steps, no evidence—the law removes it.

4. Powers of attorney are powerful, but they are not magic. If the real owners refuse to be applicants, an attorney cannot easily turn a personal dispute into a statutory right of review.

5. Fairness matters in life, but it does not always matter in a statute. The most empowering litigation mindset is to ask: “What must I prove under the Act, and what documents show it?” That shift is often the difference between frustration and control.

Q&A Session

Q1: If the property is empty but I stay there temporarily, does that still count as “occupied”?
A1: Under the clause 6 framework, “unoccupied land” is defined as land not being used or occupied for any purpose. Temporary living in the property tends to undermine the “unoccupied” requirement, even if you do not claim it as your principal place of residence. The safest assumption is that any meaningful use or residence can defeat the concession for that period.

Q2: What kind of evidence best proves “intention” to move in?
A2: Evidence that shows concrete steps: relocation planning, employment or schooling arrangements, visa or travel arrangements where relevant, correspondence showing timeline decisions, building plans or quotes tied to occupation needs, finance applications, and statements from the intending occupier explaining their circumstances and steps. The key is that the Tribunal must be able to assess intention objectively.

Q3: Isn’t it unfair that a reassessment arrives years later?
A3: It can feel unfair. Legally, however, reassessment is often authorised where an exemption is revoked by statute once conditions are not met. The core issue becomes whether the statutory requirements were satisfied in each year, and whether the reassessment power was exercised within the authorised timeframe.

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Appendix: Reference for Comparable Case Judgments and Practical Guidelines

1. Practical Positioning of This Case

Case Subtype: Land Tax Merits Review – Principal Place of Residence Exemption (Unoccupied Intended PPR Concession for Joint Owners) and Standing under Taxation Review Legislation

Judgment Nature Definition: Final Judgment (final reasons and orders determining the merits and standing)

2. Self-examination of Core Statutory Elements

This case belongs most closely to Category ⑨ Civil Litigation and Dispute Resolution, adapted to a merits review environment where statutory standing, jurisdiction, evidentiary burden, and procedural obligations are central.

⑨ Civil Litigation and Dispute Resolution

Core Test: Has the Limitation Period expired? Does the Court have Jurisdiction over the matter? Has the duty of Discovery/Disclosure of evidence been satisfied?

Step 1: Jurisdiction and review pathway
– Identify the enabling legislation that grants a right of external merits review.
– Confirm the decision is an administratively reviewable decision.
– Confirm the tribunal’s jurisdictional gateway provisions are satisfied (including any objection prerequisites).
– In a taxation merits review, confirm the decision has been the subject of a valid objection where required.

Step 2: Standing as an “interested person” or “taxpayer”
– Identify the statutory definition of who may apply for review (often “taxpayer” or “person aggrieved”).
– Map the applicant’s legal relationship to the assessment:
– Have they been assessed as liable to pay tax?
– Have they paid the tax?
– Are they liable or may they be liable?
– If relying on a power of attorney:
– Identify whether the attorney is bringing the application on behalf of the principal or in their own right.
– Ensure the proceeding is not framed in a way that contradicts the principal’s position or wishes.
– Ensure documentation supports authority and the relationship to the statutory right.

Step 3: Identify the statutory issue in dispute
– Translate broad complaints (unfairness, hardship, lack of notice) into the precise statutory questions the tribunal must answer.
– Example structure:
– Which exemption/concession is claimed?
– What are its cumulative conditions?
– Which conditions are contested?

Step 4: Evidentiary burden and the onus
– Confirm who bears the onus under the review statute.
– Construct an element-by-element proof plan.
– For each element, identify:
– What facts must be established.
– What documents or testimony prove those facts.
– What the opposing party is likely to contest.

Step 5: Disclosure and evidence assembly (practical substitute for formal discovery in merits review)
– In merits review, formal discovery may be limited, but the practical equivalent is:
– requesting relevant documents in the section 58 bundle;
– ensuring your own evidence is organised, consistent, and timely.
– A relatively high risk arises where the applicant relies on unsworn assertions for matters that require objective proof.

Step 6: Timing risks and “hard deadlines” in taxation contexts
– Taxation disputes often involve:
– objection time limits;
– review application time limits; and
– reassessment limitation rules with specific statutory extensions for particular concession regimes.
– Even where a taxpayer believes there was no notice, statutes may impose proactive return obligations to notify changed circumstances.

3. Equitable Remedies and Alternative Claims

Because this is a statutory land tax and merits review dispute, equitable “counter-attacks” are limited, but some structured alternatives can still be considered in a non-absolute, cautious way.

Procedural Fairness (Natural Justice)
– Was there an opportunity to be heard during the review process?
– Was the taxpayer given a fair opportunity to provide information and respond to concerns?
– Was there any apprehension of bias?
In taxation review settings, a procedural fairness argument tends to be more relevant to judicial review of administrative action than to a merits review that re-makes the decision. In a merits review tribunal, the focus usually returns to whether the statutory criteria are satisfied on the evidence before the tribunal. Even so, procedural fairness issues can sometimes explain evidentiary gaps and may support adjournment or directions for further material.

Estoppel against the revenue authority
– Promissory or proprietary estoppel against a statutory authority is generally difficult, particularly where it would contradict a clear statute.
– A relatively high risk exists that an estoppel argument will fail where it would prevent the authority from applying legislation according to its terms.

Unjust enrichment or restitution
– These doctrines typically do not negate a tax liability created by statute.
– They may become relevant only in unusual fact patterns, such as mistaken payments where the statute provides a repayment pathway, but they rarely operate as a substitute for meeting statutory exemption criteria.

Ancillary statutory pathways
– Instead of equity, look for statutory discretion points:
– Is there an express discretion to extend time (for example, an extension mechanism like clause 6(7A))?
– What evidence is required to engage that discretion?
– Is there a separate administrative pathway to seek remission of interest or penalties, if those are in issue?
Any such pathway depends on the specific statute and administrative practice and tends to require documentary support.

4. Access Thresholds and Exceptional Circumstances

Regular Thresholds (hard indicators that commonly decide outcomes)
– Standing threshold: Only the statutory applicant class may apply (often the assessed taxpayer).
– Onus threshold: The applicant must prove the assessment is incorrect on the balance of probabilities.
– Element threshold: Every element of an exemption or concession must be satisfied for each relevant tax year.
– Return threshold: Where an exemption was granted subject to conditions, a variation return may be required when conditions are not fulfilled.
– Concession threshold (where relevant): “Unoccupied” must be maintained, and the statutory first-year progress checkpoint must be met.

Exceptional Channels (crucial)
– Extension of time or concession period:
– Where the statute provides an extension mechanism (such as a discretion to extend a concession period), it usually requires proof of:
– delay in completion of necessary works;
– exceptional circumstances beyond control;
– unavoidable delay.
– The risk is relatively high if there is little evidence of a genuine works program, because extension provisions often assume works are actually underway and delayed, not merely contemplated.

Suggestion
Do not abandon a potential claim simply because standard timing or progress conditions appear difficult. Instead, map your circumstances precisely to the statute’s exception tests and assemble evidence that targets those tests. In intention-based concessions, evidence of steps and progress tends to be the key that unlocks discretion.

5. Guidelines for Judicial and Legal Citation

Citation Angle
It is recommended to cite this case in legal submissions or debates involving:
– the objective assessment of “intention” in statutory concessions;
– the strict meaning of “unoccupied land” where occupation defeats the concession;
– the operation of revocation and reassessment mechanisms where conditions are not fulfilled;
– standing limits in taxation merits review where an attorney seeks to apply without being the assessed taxpayer.

Citation Method
As Positive Support:
– Where your matter involves a concession requiring objective intention and evidence of steps, cite this authority to demonstrate that assertions without objectively assessable material are insufficient.

As a Distinguishing Reference:
– If the opposing party cites this case, emphasise your matter’s differences:
– the intending occupier provided sworn evidence and detailed relocation steps;
– building works physically commenced or significant steps were taken within the first relevant tax year;
– the land remained genuinely unoccupied for all relevant periods;
– standing is clearly established by ownership and assessment status.

Anonymisation Rule
Do not use real names of individuals. Use procedural titles such as Applicant and Respondent.

Comparable Authorities (as cited and applied in the reasoning framework)
– FSX v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2003] NSWCATAD 219: Intention in clause 6 type concessions is assessed objectively, not merely subjectively asserted.
– Gunasti v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2012] NSWADT 218: Statutory liability to land tax is created by the Act; fairness does not provide a general discretion to override clear legislative requirements.
– Hashim v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2020] NSWCATAD 67: Reinforces limited role of fairness where legislative provisions are clear; focus remains on statutory criteria.
– Nishaharan v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2025] NSWCATAD 35: Confirms that tribunals apply statute to facts without a general discretion based on unfairness.
– Ross v Lane Cove Council [2014] NSWCA 50; (2014) 86 NSWLR 34: Illustrates principles about necessary parties and persons directly affected, used here by analogy in addressing party and standing issues in a different statutory context.
– Brataniec v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2013] NSWADT 65: Highlights that liability is created by the operation of the land tax statute rather than by the administrator’s personal choice.

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Conclusion

This case shows that statutory concessions are not powered by sympathy; they are powered by proof. If you rely on an “unoccupied but intended home” concession, you must be able to demonstrate genuine unoccupancy, objectively evidenced intention, and real progress toward enabling the property to become the owner’s home within the statutory timeline. When those links are missing, reassessment is not a punishment—it is the statute functioning exactly as drafted.

Everyone needs to understand the law and see the world through the lens of law. The in-depth analysis of this authentic judgment is intended to help everyone gradually establish a new legal mindset: True self-protection stems from the early understanding and mastery of legal rules.

Disclaimer

This article is based on the study and analysis of the public judgment of the New South Wales Civil and Administrative Tribunal (HLQ v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2025] NSWCATAD 296), aimed at promoting legal research and public understanding. The citation of relevant judgment content is limited to the scope of fair dealing for the purposes of legal research, comment, and information sharing.

The analysis, structural arrangement, and expression of views contained in this article are the original content of the author, and the copyright belongs to the author and this platform. This article does not constitute legal advice, nor should it be regarded as legal advice for any specific situation.

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